BRICS is primarily an economic alliance, rather than a political one. Yet, sooner or later, the grouping will need to develop systemic, comprehensive approaches and a unified, coordinated policy. This might prove challenging, given the BRICS member countries’ differences in legal systems and cultural traditions, says Alikber Alikberov, Director of the Russian Academy of Sciences Institute of Oriental Studies. In an interview with BRICS Business Magazine, he also shared his views on the academic and applied transformation of science, Track II diplomacy and the role of Eurasian Islam as a consolidation platform.
There is a lot of talk today about Russia’s strategic pivot toward the East. The Russian Academy of Sciences Institute of Oriental Studies, which you have led for several years now and which is the biggest and leading academic centre in this field, could obviously not ignore this trend, even though it was itself already professionally focused on the East. So what does these new Russian Oriental Studies look like? What are the most pressing challenges it faces in today’s reality?
We are, indeed, facing new tasks, while even the traditional ones have required serious rethinking. After all, we must provide reliable, verified knowledge about the East. And, considering that such assessments are used in day-to-day politics, science bears major responsibility. So, we had to significantly strengthen the entire cycle of modern research.
We analyzed which areas were short of specialists and expertise, and purposefully filled these gaps by engaging the best experts in each field. Originally, Oriental Studies focused on classical research and our Institute also dealt with theoretical and ideological issues. We substantially enhanced not only fundamental historical and philological research but also the study of contemporary societies. New departments were created (including a Centre for the Study of Contemporary China, laboratories for research into modern Central Asia and digital studies of the contemporary East), and the research infrastructure and equipment base were greatly upgraded. We introduced internal blind peer review for contemporary studies. Earlier still, we abandoned narrow, outdated topics and began implementing cutting-edge research methodologies and tools (including digital ones and neural networks) in line with modern demands. Overall, I would say that we have turned to face the state and society, and are endeavouring to be as useful as possible to the country.
As an academic, you are well known in the professional community as a specialist in Russian Islam. How would you define its uniqueness? What key aspects can be highlighted in studying it?
Russia is fundamentally an Orthodox Christian country (over 80%), yet it is also 12–13% Muslim. We have about 15 million or, by some estimates, up to 20 million Muslims. The number of actively practising believers is, of course, much smaller. But it’s not a matter of numbers: so-called ethnic Muslims mostly represent Islamic traditions in cultural terms.
Russia is a unique civilization-state based not only on Orthodox Christianity but also on the synthesis of this with Islam. We talk about this in detail in the book Russian Islam, which describes its characteristics and development.
The familiar dichotomy of traditional vs. political Islam isn’t always accurate or productive. Politicization of Islam doesn’t necessarily lead to radicalization of local societies. For instance, it can aim to strengthen civic identity. Conversely, traditional Islam isn’t always an ally of the state. For example, during the Chechen conflict, some Sufi sheikhs supported the separatists.
It’s more appropriate to talk about Russian Islam as opposed to destructive external influences as it represents a collection of Islamic traditions in Russia and a domestic school of Islamic theology, where civic identity does not run counter to religious identity. Confessional affiliation should remain a private matter. In a civilization-state, civic identity takes priority, and all others must align with it. This creates identity harmony.
It’s important to note that our Islamic traditions date back to early Islam, to the time of the First Caliphs. His companions are believed to have participated in spreading the religion into what is now Russia. For example, Islam came to Derbent in 644 AD, before it reached some Arab countries. This allows us to speak of self-sufficiency of Russian Islamic culture. There is a common perception that authentic Islam exists only in Arab countries. Yet, in reality, regions of Northern Eurasia that are now part of Russia, as well as Central Asia and the South Caucasus, played a key role in shaping Islam. Samarkand, Bukhara, and Derbent were major centres of Islamic scholarship, giving rise to a distinct Islamic culture with its own theological traditions. Eurasianism is a unique civilizational phenomenon, bound by the Russian language as lingua franca and by the shared historical destinies of many peoples. It is a multidimensional phenomenon in which religion plays an important role. So, we suggest not only speaking of Russian Islam but also of Eurasian Islam, as the result of interethnic communication. The alliance of Russian Orthodoxy and Eurasian Islam in this geopolitical space is founded on shared history, culture, and longstanding collaboration. This is a platform for consolidation that has enabled formation of a unique Eurasian culture.
This foundation of trust has taken shape over centuries: the Eurasian steppe has long united Slavic, Turkic, and many other peoples. In Russia, Orthodox Christians, Muslims, Buddhists, and Jews all live together. Judaism is also considered a traditional religion in Russia. These four religions are recognized as traditional because they have developed here within a unified, synthetic cultural space while maintaining their uniqueness. The synthesis of cultures and spiritual schools has allowed us to form a unified political community. Russian Islam, Eurasian in origin, is a vital element of this collaboration.
From the centuries-old transformative processes that shaped the Great Steppe to current events of recent months, conflict has once again engulfed the Middle East. How do you see this escalation ending?
We have outstanding experts on the Middle East who are better equipped than I am to answer that question. For example, Academician V. V. Naumkin comments on the situation almost every evening on the TV programme The Great Game, along with other colleagues.
As for the causes, outdated global interaction formats are being replaced owing to a global crisis of subjectivity. Subjectivity cannot be granted by default, nor is it guaranteed by UN resolution. You either have or don’t have political autonomy.
It turns out that even the European Union lacks subjectivity as an entity. We see imitative politics: institutions exist, diplomatic corps function, embassies are active. But issuing visas is one thing, while real policy is another.
Global processes today no longer develop as they once did, through agreements among heads of state. Every crisis marks a point where the old ways no longer work but new ones have not yet emerged. New collaboration mechanisms are being developed. This is a dangerous period when power projection is increasingly important. The result remains to be se en. For now, the situation is extremely unstable.
Some experts claim the war in the Middle East might unify the Islamic world on an anti-Western basis. Do you agree?
Not quite. There are too many contradictions, not only political, but also economic.
Arab countries still view Russia as the successor of the Soviet Union, as a protector, whereas it is not our aim to play that role, drawing on our historical credibility. Even so, it is naive to expect these countries to build consistent anti-Western policies. These states act in their own interests, seeking to use all available resources, to, as they say, sit on two chairs. In diplomatic language, this is called a balanced policy.
So, I wouldn’t place too much hope on anti-Western consolidation. Yet, within the alliances in which we participate, such as BRICS, new coalitions and opportunities are emerging with significant potential. Once our partners realize we offer not only economic growth but also sovereignty guarantees, which will become a decisive factor in their choices.
We are very different, and that’s an internal challenge for BRICS. It’s easier for Europeans: they have common regulations and similar cultures. In BRICS, we must carry out extensive cross-cultural communication work, in aligning interests and geopolitical projects, and creating effective cooperation infrastructure and mechanisms.
Your recently co-authored with Vitaly Naumkin, Scientific Director of the Institute of Oriental Studies, an article about Track II diplomacy. This method, involving unofficial, including academic, communication channels, helps foster dialogue between conflicting parties and generate solutions that might later be adopted in official negotiations. Can this tool help resolve the Iran–Israel conflict?
Absolutely. When a diplomatic and political crisis arises, it ope ns the door for scientific communication. These are not politically biased. The participants don’t blame one another for crises and misunderstandings. The task of science is to understand the root causes and then outline solutions. All significant achievements in intergovernmental relations, civil wars, or complex conflicts have involved Track II diplomacy and academic experts. We call this situational analysis. Globally, it’s called a cross-disciplinary approach, meaning experts go outside their academic disciplines to find missing arguments in practical domains.
Of course, we don’t believe that only Orientalists can understand regional conflicts. That’s why we actively involve experts from other fields: former diplomats, politicians, practitioners. They might lack methodological depth but have excellent knowledge of the context, causes and nuances of specific conflicts.
What matters most is a focus on results. If a team can be formed of experts ready to seek compromises, there are special techniques for gradually bringing positions closer together. These compromises are then conveyed along Track II channels to decision-makers.
If the parties are willing to accept the m as the most acceptable concessions, that’s already a significant step forward. No acute conflict can be re solved without compromise. The potential benefits of a pe ace agreement must outweigh any perceived gains from continued conflict, which always brings more destruction and human suffering. Even now, voices are calling on the parties in the Middle East to stop. But, in Eastern culture, the first to offer a truce may be seen as weak. It’s vital to hold the blow in order to save face, to fight to the end.
That’s where the mediator comes in, a third party, not directly involved in the conflict but able to facilitate rapprochement. As our President has said, Russia is well-positioned for this role, given our unique relations with both Iran and Israel. Track II diplomacy could become the bridge that helps the parties hear each other.
BRICS is now nearly 18 years old, an age of maturity in human terms. But the organization continues to grow and evolve. For example, at the July summit in Brazil, Indonesia participated as a full member for the first time. How do you see the future maturing of BRICS?
BRICS is primarily an economic alliance, not a political one. Yet eventually, there will be a serious challenge: any alliance requires systemic, comprehensive approaches and a unified, coordinate d policy, even though the societies, economies, political systems, cultural traditions, and legal structures of its member states are very different.
Nevertheless, BRICS is the only global organization offering new cooperation principles. Others, especially Western ones, still operate by outdated models: exploitative conditions, exploiting partners’ weaknesses, and imposing political agenda disguised as economic agreements. BRICS doesn’t do that. Here, no one tries to democratize anyone else. We simply seek strategies for joint survival, sustainable development, and mutually beneficial cooperation. Each side must gain something, only then will it work.
Take Indonesia, for example. After remaining silent for a long time, it eventually joined BRICS. Before that, the prime minister of neighbouring Malaysia, a BRICS partner, spoke out openly and rightly against Western neocolonialism.
Ultimately, regional alliances will prevail. All strong geostrategic projects operate within a shared geographic space. Communication and connectivity are key.
In this respect, Eurasia holds immense potential. That’s why our American partners are nervous: they understand Russia might return to Europe, in the broad, Eurasian sense. This is a continent that should be reintegrated into Eurasian activity, not left under Euro-Atlantic influence. It’s too early to talk about this now but perhaps in the future.
What is already clear is that the Western world is no longer predominant. This is a fundamentally important shift. We must understand it. Where are we going? In what direction? Russia is a country with a European cultural foundation. Eurasianism here is more geographical than cultural. We have extended European culture eastward, gradually weaving in elements of various Asian cultures. That’s how Russian culture has developed and, eventually, so will pan-Russian culture. This might explain why China finds Russia interesting, as the closest European country.
As we engage with the East and the South, we must not forget the West. It’s difficult at the moment but we hope to overcome the confrontation and, one day, revive cooperation.
