Over the recent decades, regular con\ufb02icts of varying intensities and natures have marked Africa, leading notably to a decline in investment and trade \ufb02ows, delaying the development of some African countries. Recent years have seen a resurgence of conflicts on the continent, mainly as a result of the activities of various Islamist groups, particularly in the Sahel region, mobilizing the armed forces of certain states on the continent and targeting civilian populations. Conflicts of political origin \u2013 sometimes mixed with ethnic, religious or even linguistic considerations \u2013 also remain present in Africa (Libya, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Cameroon…).<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Our indices of political violence also con\ufb01rm that violent events (con\ufb02icts and terrorist acts), although more localised, have become relatively common again, particularly in the Sahel, compared to the beginning of the 21st century: compared to 2008, there were almost twice as many con\ufb02icts across the continent in 2018.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Moreover, as events in North Africa and the Middle East in 2011 have shown, as mobilisation instruments develop, the exasperation of populations, fueled by socio-economic pressures exposes some countries to the risk of future instability. Although large-scale con\ufb02icts, as in Libya, or regime changes are not a given, a fragile socio-economic context can, in the long term, cause unrest that can generate, at a minimum, uncertainty in the political environment. Our political and social fragility index indicates that 10 countries \u2013 Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Mauritania, Mozambique, Uganda and the DRC \u2013 could be or continue to be affected in the foreseeable future. The increase in mobilization instruments is one of the factors behind the increased risk. This dynamic, in force throughout the continent, could potentially lead to a multiplication of destabilizing political events in Africa in the longer-term.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
As Coface reported in 2017, the world is experiencing an upsurge in con\ufb02icts that has not abated in recent years: despite a decline in 2018 after the historical record set in 2017, the number of con\ufb02icts has increased by 70% since 2008, with 2.2 times more victims. Over the past \ufb01ve years, the number of casualties has exceeded the 70,000 mark each year for the third time in 30 years (after the 1990-1991 periods, at the height of the Gulf War, and 1999-2000, marked by the fratricidal war between Ethiopia and Eritrea). At the same time, terrorism is spreading as another form of political violence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Often described as a continent prone to con\ufb02ict and terrorism, data from the indices compiled by Coface con\ufb01rms this. In the 2019 version of the Con\ufb02ict Risk Index, 25 of the 45 African countries evaluated9 have a non-zero score. In total, only 52 countries in the world are in this situation. African countries therefore contribute to the overall upward trend in global con\ufb02icts. The increase in con\ufb02icts on the continent is driven in particular by those that do not involve a state. At both global and continental levels, this type of con\ufb02ict has tripled since the beginning of the decade, but is nevertheless increasing more rapidly in Africa. The region is therefore, by far, the region with the largest number of non-state con\ufb02icts. The proliferation of clashes between armed militias in Libya, the CAR and the DRC contributes to this trend, as do clashes between Oromo and Somali in Ethiopia, and between Berom farmers, Christians, and Fulani herders, Muslims, in the Plateau State of Nigeria.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
While the increase in the number of non-state con\ufb02icts is remarkable, it should not overshadow those involving a state, which have also surged over the past \ufb01ve years, mainly due to the \ufb01ght against armed Islamist groups, including those affiliated to the Islamic State (IS). This is particularly the case in the Sahel and around Lake Chad, justifying the place of Nigeria, Mali, Chad and Niger as the countries with the highest con\ufb02ict scores. In 2018, Egypt and Libya were also engaged in con\ufb02icts against IS. In addition, among the highest scores on the continent is also Cameroon, where clashes in the English-speaking regions between the army and the defense forces of the self-proclaimed Republic of Ambazonia intensified during an election year that saw President Paul Biya win a seventh term. In Sudan, the struggle between government forces and resistance movements in the conflict areas united within the Sudan Revolutionary Front continued in the country, and notably testifies to the still precarious security situation in Darfur.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In addition, with the increase in the number of organized non-governmental armed groups targeting civilian populations, the increase in the number of con\ufb02icts is concomitant with the increase in terrorist acts in Africa. It is therefore unsurprising that among the 25 countries with a conflict score above the minimum threshold of 0%, 24 also have a non-zero terrorism score (the exception being Eritrea).<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The sharp increase in the number of con\ufb02icts on the continent since the beginning of the decade has been accompanied by an increase in the number of victims associated with them: there were on average just under 15,000 victims in Africa per year, during the period 2014-2018, almost three times as many as between 2004 and 2008. In contrast, the average number of deaths from con\ufb02ict over the last \ufb01ve years remains half that recorded in the 1990s, when it exceeded 30,000 deaths per year. At the same time, Africa\u2019s contribution to the record level of victims in global con\ufb02icts is weakening, dwarfed by the con\ufb02icts in Syria (23% of the world\u2019s con\ufb02ict victims between 2014 and 2018) and Afghanistan (19%), which have proved more deadly than all con\ufb02icts combined in Africa.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In contrast, over the past \ufb01ve years (2013-2017), more than 28% of terrorist victims have been killed on the African continent, an increase of 10 percentage points over the previous period. Nevertheless, again, a handful of countries \u2013 mainly in the Middle East (Iraq, Yemen, Syria) and South Asia (Afghanistan and Pakistan) \u2013 are far more affected by terrorism.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In Africa, terrorist activity by Islamist groups dominates, particularly in conflict areas: in the Sahel10, as well as in Libya and Egypt. Nearly 60% of the victims of terrorism in Africa are concentrated in these eight countries. Kenya and Mozambique, with scores of 62% and 44% respectively, also rank in the \ufb01rst quartile of the riskiest countries in our index, mainly due to the activity of Islamist terrorist groups (al-Shabaab in Kenya and Ansar al-Sunna in Mozambique). Finally, in addition to Cameroon, which is particularly affected by Boko Haram\u2019s incursions into the Far North, the presence of CAR and DRC among the ten riskiest countries in our index provides additional examples of how con\ufb02ict and terrorism regularly go hand in hand on the continent.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Map 1 highlights all these dynamics, and notably the high geographical concentration in a few risk areas. It also displays the insecurity in the Sahel (particularly in the Lake Chad region), the impact of the Somali security challenge on Kenya, and also the tensions in Kivu and the Kamwina Nsapu insurgency in the DRC. The map shows that con\ufb02icts on the African continent are generally relatively localized: an increase in con\ufb02icts does not necessarily imply an increase in the geographical extent of the con\ufb02ict. In addition, the map highlights areas where risk is low. Southern African countries are mostly spared, with the notable exception of South Africa, where political assassination attempts drive up the score. More surprisingly, unlike its peers in the G5 Sahel force, Mauritania\u2019s score remains at 0%, having not experienced a terrorist attack on its territory since 2011. With a score of 1%, Morocco justi\ufb01es its status as a \u2018safe country\u2019 in the region11.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Although instructive, the risk indices of con\ufb02ict and terrorism, based on past observation, off er only a vision of extreme episodes of violence. However, political risk is also about understanding the moments of disruption that lead to a profound change in a country\u2019s political structure.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Coface Political Risk model is based on the assumption that cracks in the foundations of the political system \u2013 which may be related to the nature of the regime, the design of institutions, the degree of political freedom and the cohesion of the population \u2013 expose a country to a risk of popular movement and\/or destabilization of the regime. While democratic practice, at least in its electoral dimension, has become widespread on the African continent since the early 1990s, some recent examples \u2013 starting with the DRC, Sudan and Algeria \u2013 show that it is not necessarily accompanied by a solid political and institutional framework.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Furthermore, the Coface political fragility index indicates that the average score in Africa was 15 points higher than the world average. The African continent is only two points behind the Middle East. This substantial difference with the rest of the world is rooted in relatively weak institutional environments in many countries on the continent, a sometimes limited political offer (despite the organization of de jure multi-party elections), a limited space for expression, and an ethnic, linguistic and\/or religious fractionalization of the population that may fuel political tensions. For example, in terms of these indicators, Eritrea stands out at the top of the 2018 ranking. In addition to the signi\ufb01cantly higher average, it can be noted that only six countries have a score below the world median (Botswana, Mauritius, Madagascar, Sao Tome and Principe, Cape Verde and Tunisia), indicating widespread fragility in Africa. Despite this relatively high level, it is also worth noting the near two-point improvement in the continent\u2019s average score between 2010 and 2018. This is the result of the signi\ufb01cant improvement in some countries, particularly C\u00f4te d\u2019Ivoire post-electoral crisis of 2010-2011 (from 97% to 65%), Tunisia post-revolution (from 45% to 16%) and Burkina Faso post-Compaor\u00e9 (from 73% to 63%).<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Nevertheless, as our study already indicated in 2017, these political weaknesses alone do not necessarily materialize in risk. The social risk indicator, which makes it possible to understand the emergence of popular movements, by linking pressures for change with instruments facilitating popular mobilization, can be one of the triggering factors. The recent Sudanese case illustrated, for instance, how this type of socio-economic pressure, under certain conditions, could turn into political change: the government\u2019s decision to triple bread prices in 2018 to cope with the economic crisis (collapse in the value of the currency, continued depletion of foreign exchange reserves and in\ufb02ation above 70%) was the trigger for the demonstrations that ended the 30-year rule of Omar al-Bashir. The Coface social risk indicator had, prior to the outbreak of this crisis, pointed out Sudan\u2019s vulnerability to this type of popular movement. In addition to having the second highest score, after Libya, the country also recorded an increase of nearly 9 points in this indicator (from 62% to 71%) between 2008 and 2018.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
More generally, in Africa, the social risk index is, on average, at its highest level since the 2010 peak, which preceded the popular movements of the \u2018Arab Spring\u2019. However, unlike in 2010, it is also evident that the instruments of mobilization, much more than the pressures for change, are experiencing an almost uninterrupted acceleration.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In terms of country-by-country data, almost all countries on the continent, with the exception of Eritrea, Libya and Chad, have seen their mobilization instrument scores increase. For example, Djibouti experienced an increase of 20 percentage points between 2008 and 2018, Ghana by 15, South Africa by 12, and Cameroon by 11. While most indicators contribute to this increase in the power of mobilization instruments on the continent, the increase in internet access can be particularly noted. Indeed, recent events in Algeria and Sudan have further highlighted the importance of social networks in mobilizing people. Moreover, as recent examples show (DRC, Gabon, Sudan, Benin…), some governments, arguing the need to preserve public order, decide to cut off the internet when the political climate becomes tense. Urbanisation and the growing proportion of the population with access to tertiary education are also contributing to the overall increase in instrument scores on the continent.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Unsurprisingly, the ranking of the block of mobilisation instruments is dominated over the 11 years of observation by the \ufb01ve North African countries (Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia). In sub-Saharan Africa, despite the progress recorded, only Mauritius, Cape Verde, Gabon and South Africa have \u2018instrument\u2019 scores above the world average for this indicator. On the other hand, 80% of the 45 countries on the continent have \u2018pressure\u2019 scores above the average of global pressures.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Thus, it would be this lack of mobilisation instruments that would essentially be at the root of a social risk that would not systematically materialize in sub-Saharan Africa. Nevertheless, the progress made in this area could be enough to create some unrest. The Top 10 countries in our global social risk indicator already highlight many of the countries where risk has already materialized: in addition to Sudan, mentioned above, the demonstrations calling for a change in the political class in Algeria, those following the rise in fuel prices in Zimbabwe and the attempted coup d\u2019\u00e9tat in Gabon are evidence that the high risk level of our index can transform into destabilisation. It is therefore not surprising that the overall social risk indicator is still largely dominated by these countries. Libya remains in \ufb01rst place on the African continent, as it has done since 2007. More than eight years after Muammar Gadda\ufb01 \u2019s fall, socio-economic conditions remain precarious, fueled by the political and security instability that has plagued the country since then. Despite the overthrows of Hosni Mubarak in 2011 and Mohamed Morsi in 2013, Egypt\u2019s score also remains at a high level. The stabilisation of the economic situation since 2016 and the start of the IMF programme have not particularly eased the pressures, which remain at a level similar to that reached in 2009 and 2010. Difficulties of access to the labour market and high in\ufb02ation are some of the potential elements of exasperation towards an executive power that should be part of the long term, particularly after the constitutional revision, adopted by referendum (last April), which extended President Abdel Fattah al-Sissi\u2019s mandate and will allow him to run for a third term in 2024.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Nevertheless, beyond identifying countries where the risk has already occurred, the political and social fragility index which combines the scores of the two indices described above, can potentially indicate which countries to monitor in the near future. To identify these countries, we used two criteria:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The ten countries identified, which are in the top right-hand quarter of Chart 2, are: Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Mauritania, Mozambique, Uganda and the DRC.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Some of these countries have already experienced major changes. In addition to Egypt, mentioned above, Angola and Ethiopia, which experienced a change of executive in 2017 and 2018 respectively, are still in our category of countries to watch. Despite the reforms undertaken by President Jo\u00e3o Louren\u00e7o (Angola) and Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed (Ethiopia), the economic crisis following the fall in oil prices in Angola and the persistence of the ethno-socio-political tensions that had already led to Hailemariam Desalegn\u2019s departure in Ethiopia maintain a high level of risk. Following chaotic elections, which saw Felix Tshisekedi succeed Joseph Kabila, the DRC also remains in this category. However, accusations of fraud in the elections, as well as the victory of Mr Kabila\u2019s party in the parliamentary elections, fuel suspicion that the former president continues to lead one of the world\u2019s poorest countries in the shadows.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Cameroon must also be monitored, as Paul Biya\u2019s reappointment for a seventh consecutive term in office comes in a context of increasing fragmentation of the country, linked in particular to the crisis in the English-speaking regions, and socio-economic conditions that remain precarious for a large part of the population. Finally, the presence of Djibouti, Chad and Uganda, which have in common with Cameroon to be governed by leaders whose longevity is the highest on the continent, should also be noted.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Mozambique will need to be followed closely in the coming months, with general elections expected in October. After contentious municipal elections in 2018, tensions remain high between the Mozambique Liberation Front (Frelimo), in power since 1975, and the Mozambique National Resistance (Renamo), an armed guerilla that has become a political party, threatening the peace process launched in 2016. The history of violence in the country, coupled with persistent socio-economic difficulties (following, in particular, the debt crisis and the passage of two cyclones at the beginning of the year) and the perception of rampant corruption fuel a discontent that could be expressed during these elections.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
It should be noted that the countries in the lower right-hand corner of Chart 2 i.e. those with high scores but no progress, have experienced episodes of political instability in the recent past. This is the case for Algeria and Sudan, as discussed above, but also for Gabon and Nigeria. Even countries with a decline over these 10 years but a score above the African average have distinguished themselves in terms of political instability. In Togo, demonstrations challenging a constitutional reform that would allow President Faure Gnassingb\u00e9 to run for two new terms in 2020 and 2025 have increased in recent years. In this category, Zimbabwe can also be added.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In the upper left corner are the countries whose scores have increased substantially, but remain below average: in Mali, security tensions could put pressure on the local political climate. In Tanzania and Zambia, voices denouncing the authoritarian shifts in the administrations of Presidents John Magufuli and Edgar Lungu testify to this fragility.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Finally, it is worth noting the countries that have slipped in the lower right-hand corner of the matrix in this graph. Tunisia and C\u00f4te d\u2019Ivoire recorded the largest decline in their scores over the period. The Tunisian revolution of 2011 and the Ivorian crisis of 2010-2011 made it possible to de\ufb02ate the fragility scores, contributing greatly to this dynamic. The same is true for Burkina Faso after the attempted coup in 2015. The elections, to be held in 2019 and 2020 respectively in Tunisia and C\u00f4te d\u2019Ivoire, should nevertheless put to the test the consolidation of the legacy of these political crises.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cUnfortunately, Africa has remained a pocket of constant political and social turmoil for several decades already. Persistent internal and external social and political tensions often break out into armed conflicts spanning whole regions of the African continent. Needless to say, war-time conditions are certainly not the conditions under which international business would be willing to invest into opening its subsidiaries and developing its manufacturing facilities in African countries,\u201d said Vassily Chekulaev, Coface Russia CEO. \u201cYes, it is a given that in relatively stable countries of the continent that adhere to and enforce the norms of the international law entrepreneurs may manage to establish stable operations. Nevertheless, ever since World War II large corporations are acutely aware of the fact that political instability is a highly threatening and extremely volatile risk factor. In worst case scenarios a radical political change may not only cause the business to lose market as a consequence of a dramatic decrease of the population\u2019s purchasing capacity, but also to fail to keep its commercial assets and goods intact.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Coface<\/em><\/strong> is a global flagship trade credit insurance company specializing in credit risk coverage and risk management.<\/p>\n\n\n\n On February 23, 2019, <\/strong>nearly 73\u00a0million Nigerian voters were called to vote for their new president. Four days later, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) con\ufb01rmed the re-election of incumbent President Muhammadu Buhari. Our model highlights that he has begun its second four-year term in a political context precarious in many respects.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Nigeria\u2019s con\ufb02ict index, which was below 30% until 2009, jumped with the advent of Boko Haram, reaching 100% in 2015 \u2013 a score that did not decline until 2018, when it fell to 85%. The country has also had the highest terrorism index score on the continent since 2012. As a consequence, almost four years after President Buhari\u2019s statement that Boko Haram was \u201ctechnically defeated\u201d, indications derived from our terrorism and con\ufb02ict indices suggest that, although now fragmented into several disparate factions, the islamist group has maintained a dangerous strike force, killing more than 18,000 civilians between 2009 and 2018. The decline in the Coface indices re\ufb02ects a relative decrease in the intensity of the Boko Haram group\u2019s activity. However, in Nigeria, although some con\ufb02icts do not directly involve the state, they are still located within the country itself. Ethnic and religious divisions, particularly between the Muslim north and the Christian south, is a source of much friction between communities, particularly in the centre of the country, and can lead to the outbreak of deadly con\ufb02icts. The resurgence of tensions in the Plateau State between Berom farmers (Christian) and Fulani herders (Muslim) has contributed to the rise in the con\ufb02ict and terrorism index score. In 2018, clashes between the two ethnic groups resulted in nearly 300 deaths.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Nigeria also has a relatively high political and social fragility index score at 59%, after peaking at 61% in the previous year. In addition to the fragility of the institutional, social, ethnic and religious structure, this score is linked to the economic crisis following the 2014 oil counter-shock, with the country recording its \ufb01rst recession in 25 years (in 2016). As a consequence, gross domestic product (GDP) per capita has not increased for four years, and with Coface\u2019s growth forecast for 2019 (2.3%), a \ufb01fth consecutive year seems likely. The crisis is re\ufb02ected in a record level of unemployment (23.1% at the end of the third quarter of 2018) and in\ufb02ation above 10% for more than three years. Therefore, in addition to insecurity, the issue of living standards in Nigeria \u2013 which is already one of the countries with the highest number of people living below the poverty line \u2013 will therefore be one of the major challenges of President Buhari\u2019s second term. At the end of a \ufb01rst mandate with very contrasting results, the patience of Nigerians towards the one who inherited the nickname \u201cBaba Go Slow\u201d by his detractors (who blame him for the slowness of the implementation of reforms) could quickly run out.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Africa has seen a bevy of political events in recent months. After the deterioration of the security situation in the Sahel, as well as the forced departures of historical leaders from Algeria and Sudan via the streets, where will the political risks manifest in the second half of the year? Using its quantitative political risk model, Coface intends to identify\u00a0\u2013 beyond the pace dictated by current events\u00a0\u2013 recent political risk trends and thus the countries to be monitored.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":1025,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1041],"tags":[876],"country":[923],"authors":[880,879],"class_list":["post-1020","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-context","tag-876","country-africa","authors-mauratille-eloi","authors-nizard-ruben"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\n
\n\n\n\nNigeria: political risk in all its forms<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n