An
attack on an Indian battalion by the militants of Lashkar-e-Taiba – one
of the most active terrorist organizations in South Asia, based in
Pakistan near Lahore – took place on 18 September 2016. The military
unit was located near the town of Uri in Jammu and Kashmir, a territory
disputed over many decades of conflict between irreconcilable neighbors –
India and Pakistan. The attack killed 19 Indian soldiers and officers.
Officials in New Delhi then said that the gunmen came from Pakistan and
accused Islamabad of supporting terrorism, threatening retaliation. On
29 September, Indian special forces conducted an operation in the
Pakistan-controlled part of Kashmir, destroying seven militant hideouts
and killing more than three dozen extremists.
Although Islamabad denied
the information about the Indian commandos at the time, stating that
there was a simple exchange of fire, mortar and artillery ‘duels’
between the militaries of the two countries have taken place regularly
since then, and there have been dozens of casualties on both sides, both
military and civilian. Observers are even starting to say that ‘the war
across the control line’ has already begun. United Nations University
experts went even further, putting forward the hypothesis that further
worsening of relations between India and Pakistan in the long term can
lead to nothing short of nuclear war. They also named one of the
probable causes of the escalating conflict: the struggle for control
over the water resources of the Indus. “The basin of the Indus River is a
water ‘time bomb’ that could explode at any time, exacerbating water
scarcity in the region and causing irreparable changes to the climate,”
said Dr. Vladimir Smakhtin, director of the UNU Institute for Water,
Environment and Health in Hamilton, Canada.
According to him, the
problem of access to fresh water on the Indian subcontinent is already
at a critical point today. To a certain extent, it relates to climate
change, which has already caused a steady runoff decline in the Indus
tributary. An additional factor worsening the problem is increased water
consumption in neighboring China and Afghanistan.
According to UN
forecasts, the Indus and other rivers of South Asia will suffer from
further climate change. In the future, the lack of water could cause
internal destabilization in the region, especially in Pakistan, where
water consumption is particularly high, while the political system looks
extremely shaky.
There is another important
reason that points to water as one of the main reasons for the
festering conflict in the Indian subcontinent: an unprecedented
statement from New Delhi indicating that India might revise or even pull
out of the agreement regulating water relations between the two
countries that has been in force for the past 60 years.
The cause for such concern
were the words of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi soon after the
September attack on Uri, who said that “blood and water cannot flow at
the same time”. It seems that the nightmare of all Pakistani leaders is
coming true: New Delhi is damming three tributaries of the Indus in its
territory that flow to Pakistan, and the ‘first Muslim country of South
Asia’ will enter the era of droughts.
Such fears are not
unfounded, to put it mildly, as they have a long history. The problem of
Hindustan is that the local rivers are mostly of glacial origin with
their sources in the Himalayas. Pakistan is located in the Indus Valley
(so it is sometimes referred to as the Country of the Indus, in contrast
to India, the Country of the Ganges). The dispute over the water of the
Indus has been going on since 1947, when British India split into
independent India and Pakistan.
The Indus Waters Treaty
regulating river water distribution in the area was signed in 1960,
under the mediation of the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development. According to the document, Islamabad gained control over
the Indus, as well as two large tributaries – the Chenab and the Jhelum –
flowing from the mountains on the Indian territory. India was allowed
to use the water for irrigation of the surrounding fields and the needs
of local residents. Accordingly, New Delhi was given full control over
the other three tributaries of the Indus – the Beas, the Ravi, and the
Sutlej.
For all these years, New
Delhi believed the agreed contractual rights to the water flowing into
Pakistan had not been fully implemented. Islamabad, by contrast, tends
to believe that the Indians already take too much from the ‘Pakistani’
rivers. Nevertheless, until now, the sides have tried to comply with the
treaty. Despite three Indo-Pakistani wars and a dozen military
scuffles, water continued to flow. Modi was the first Indian leader who
started to openly threaten to limit the flow of the rivers into
Pakistan. Unsurprisingly, Islamabad has already said that such actions
of their ‘partners’ would be regarded as “a declaration of war”.
No choice but to negotiate
Fortunately,
the likelihood that New Delhi will go beyond threats this time does not
seem to be very high and the reasons for that are quite prosaic.First
of all, should the water supply of the rivers be stopped, India would
have to address the question “Where would the water go?” “We do not have
the infrastructure to store this water. We have not built dams in
J&K where we can store water. And being a mountainous state, unlike
Tamil Nadu or Karnataka, you cannot move water to another state. So, you
cannot stop the water technically,” said Ahmad Romshoo, an employee of
the Department of Geology and Geophysics, University of Kashmir, in his
interview with Asian Age.
Not surprisingly, the
Indian prime minister’s recent statements on this issue have become more
realistic. Now, he is no longer talking about cutting off the flow of
the rivers, but merely about reducing to zero (including as a result of
poor irrigation) the wasted outflow of water from the Indian rivers into
the territory of their neighbor: “Now every drop of this water will be
stopped, and I will give that to farmers of Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir
and Indian farmers. I am committed to this.” At the same time, the
prime minister set up a special government task force, which aims to
ensure that “each drop of water” that flows out of Sutlej, Beas, and
Ravi reaches the residents of India.
Secondly, should it
withdraw from the Indus Waters Treaty, which does not formally provide
for such a possibility, New Delhi will inevitably have to suffer a
serious blow to its reputation in the eyes of the world, since many
still believe that strong evidence of Pakistani involvement in the Uri
incident has not been presented.
To a certain extent, that
is the reason why New Delhi’s attempts to pressure Islamabad politically
have not been particularly successful. In particular, the unprecedented
statement by the Indian side that, in response to Pakistan’s support
for Kashmiri separatists, the Indian side might lend its support to
separatists in the Pakistani province of Balochistan, remains on paper.
Previously, India had consistently stressed respect for the territorial
integrity of its neighbors and demanded the same from them, and in this
sense, such a step by Modi is unprecedented in Indian political history.
According to experts, support for Baluchistan nationalism will generate
additional tension in the already-strained relations between the two
countries, strengthening the position of Pakistan’s hawks. As a
consequence, we may see open support for anti-Indian forces in Kashmir,
which Islamabad will unapologetically provide. “Do not forget that the
Baluchis also live in Iran and Afghanistan, so Kabul and Tehran are not
likely to be ecstatic over Indian assistance to Baluchistan
nationalists,” stated Indian political analyst Arun Shourie to BRICS Business Magazine.
Now, the expert adds, New
Delhi is arguing for Islamabad’s international isolation, trying to turn
it into a pariah state. To this end, India has basically sabotaged the
summit of the South Asian Regional Cooperation Association (SAARC),
which had been planned in Islamabad at the beginning of November.
Narendra Modi’s refusal to participate, supported by the heads of
Bangladesh, Afghanistan, and Bhutan, forced Pakistani authorities to
announce the postponement of the meeting “for an indefinite period of
time”.
ARMAGEDDON ON THE INDIAN SUBCONTINENT
A
nuclear war on the Indian subcontinent would have dire consequences. By
various estimates, India and Pakistan possess approximately 130 to 140
nuclear warheads and delivery systems: multi-role fighter, ballistic,
and cruise missiles. According to a joint study conducted in 2007 by a
group of American experts from Rutgers University, the University of
Colorado at Boulder, and the University of California, if the two
countries were to use about a hundred nuclear warheads with the nominal
power of ‘one Hiroshima’ (this is much less than half the total arsenal
of the two countries), the atomic blasts, burns and acute radiation
would immediately kill more than 21 million people, and the number of
victims would keep growing.
As
pointed out by Indian expert on defense Abheet Singh Sethi, in the
event of such a conflict, neighboring countries – Afghanistan, Iran, the
countries in Central Asia, and China – will also be seriously affected.
What’s more, if India were to bomb Lahore or Karachi, for example, and
should the winds turn eastward, that could spell big problems for most
of India herself, especially the northwestern part. According to
estimates by experts from the global movement International Physicians
for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW), a nuclear conflict on the
Indian subcontinent would threaten the life of more than two billion
people around the world because of the negative impact nuclear
explosions would have on the climate, which could lead to ‘nuclear winter’.
In contrast, India’s push
for recognition of Pakistan as a country exporting terrorism has not met
with much success. In particular, Western countries, led by the United
States, which have traditionally been allies of Islamabad in South Asia,
spoke out against it. “We believe that Pakistan can directly contribute
to regional stability by acting against militants on its soil who seek
to attack its neighbors,” said John Kirby, a spokesman for the US State
Department, in late November. At the same time, he quite transparently
hinted that the US administration will not go for any kind of worsening
of relations with Islamabad.
In turn, the BRICS Summit in Goa held in
mid-October has demonstrated that the isolationist policies of New Delhi
against Islamabad are unlikely to find support among its leading
partners in this block. Despite an India-sponsored BRICS joint statement
about readiness to build a united front against terrorism, the
Pakistan-based terrorist groups that commit attacks in the Indian part
of Kashmir were not mentioned in the final declaration. Beijing, which
is the main economic partner of Islamabad in the region, does not see
the benefits of playing on the Indian side. For instance, the People’s
Republic is investing billions of yuan in the construction of a
transport corridor through Pakistan that will provide it with an outlet
to the Persian Gulf. Russia also has its interests in relations with
Pakistan, which offer different value to Moscow. That is why it seems
that, today, New Delhi and Islamabad have no choice but to try to
resolve their differences by returning to the negotiating table – as
they have done numerous times over the 50-year history of relations
between the two countries. Otherwise, in the long term, the increase of
tensions is inevitable, and the darkest fears of UN experts regarding
the nuclear conflict over water may actually become a reality sooner
rather than later.